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Amazon Burning and the World Bank:
Lessons from the Second World Bank
Inspection Panel Claim
By David Hunter'
I. INTRODUCTIONA dverse publicity from the Narmada dam controversy2 and
release of an internal World Bank report detailing poor
project quality,3 as well as explicit pressure from several
donor governments, led the World Bank to create an independent
Inspection Panel in September 1993. The Panel's August 1994
opening marked the first time in the Bank's 50-year history that
people harmed by Bank-funded projects could request inde-
pendent reviews of Bank activities. With the advent of the Panel,
the Bank also became the first international institution outside of
the European Union to create a mechanism by which citizens
could demand accountability without involving their government.
The Panel's mission is to investigate claims filed by affected parties
and to review the Bank's compliance with its own policies and
procedures. After receiving a claim, the Panel conducts a prelimi-
nary assessment, including a review of the claim, and Manage-
ment's response. Based on this assessment, the Panel recommends
to the Executive Directors whether a full inspection is warranted.
The Executive Directors retain sole power to authorize a full
inspection. For inspections that go forward, the Panel enjoys broad
investigatory powers including access to all Bank Management and
staff. After the investigation, the Panel issues a report with its rec-
ommendations to Bank Management and the Executive Directors.
Management is provided six weeks to respond and provide its own
recommendations to the Executive Directors, who make all final
decisions.5
The first claim filed with the Panel alleged violations of environ-
mental assessment, resettlement and other policies in the siting of
the controversial Arun III hydroelectric dam in Nepal.6 Arun III
was a 201 megawatt hydroelectric dam with a price tag of nearly a
billion dollars. The initial Bank loan would have been for $175
million. The Panel had just completed a full inspection into the
alleged violations when World Bank President James Wolfensohn
announced in August, 1995 that the Bank would no longer sup-
port the project. Mr. Wolfensohn cited the work of the Inspection
Panel as one of the reasons for his decision.
This article describes the PLANAFLORO claim, the second major
claim filed with the Panel. 7 The PLANAFLORO claim was filed
in June, 1995 by twenty-five Brazilian organizations, representing
small farmers, rubber tappers, indigenous communities, rural
unions, and environmental and human rights groups affected by
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the loan. The claim raises serious issues about Bank oversight,
monitoring and implementation, with implications far beyond the
PLANAFLORO project.
II. BACKGROUND TO THE PLANAFLORO CLAIM
The State of Rondonia in western Brazil includes over 20 million
hectares of Amazon forest, is rich in biodiversity and is home to
several thousand indigenous peoples. In recent years, Rondonia
has become a frontier state, as Brazil's development strategy
emphasized opening up the Amazon by punching roads into the
forest and luring the urban poor to the region with unrealistic
promises of wealth. The ensuing cycle of development has created
substantial environmental and social problems. The roads are
built; colonists, goldminers, and ranchers arrive; the land is
cleared, often by fire and planted with export crops; the Amazon's
remarkably poor soil is exhausted after a few years; and the
colonists, still poor, move deeper into the forest. At the beginning
of the 1980s, only 2% of Rondonia was deforested. By the end of
the decade, approximately 25% of the state had been burned or
otherwise deforested.
In the late 1980's, the burning of the Amazon and the related
murder of activist Chico Mendes galvanized international atten-
tion on the environmental and social damage occurring in the
Amazon, and turned the public eye on the Bank's POLONOROESTE
project.9 POLONOROESTE, widely considered one of the worst
ecological disaster ever supported by the Bank, was an infamous
road construction project that opened much of Brazil's Amazon to
slash-and-burn logging and unsustainable agriculture. 10 Over
$240 million dollars went to paving a major highway (Highway
BR 364), and another $200 million was destined for feeder roads,
health programs and rural development. The indigenous popula-
tions received $10 million, in what at the time was considered a
unique effort to earmark specific funds for indigenous needs. Still,
the project was widely criticized from the beginning, including by
consultants and employees of the Bank. The Bank would tem-
porarily suspend financing for the project, and, ultimately, Bank
President Barber Conable would admit:
The Bank misread the human, institutional and physical
realities of the jungle and the frontier. A road which benefit-
ted small farmers also became a highway for logging compa-
nies. Protective measures to shelter fragile land and tribal
1
people were carefully planned. They were not, however, exe-
cuted with enough vigor. In some cases the dynamics of the
frontier got out of control. Polonoroeste teaches many
lessons. A basic truth is that ambitious environmental design
requires realistic analysis of the enforcement mechanisms in
place and in prospect.11
Conable's speech was undoubtedly self-serving in that from the
beginning the Bank had ignored clear warnings from Bank
employees and consultants, as well as NGOs, that the project was
poorly designed and environmentally unsound. But Conable's
admission also sparked some hope that the Bank may have learned
something from POLONOROESTE, and that the damage would
not have been in vain.
It was this hope, in part, that led to the Rondonia Natural
Resource Management Project (known by its Portuguese acronym
PLANAFLORO). The PLANAFLORO project is based on large-
scale social and economic "agroecological" zoning, designed in part
to intensify logging and agricultural activities in developed areas
that could sustain them ecologically, and to demarcate and protect
other areas, including indigenous territories and ecological reserves.
The PLANAFLORO project eventually received widespread sup-
port among environmentalists, rubber tappers, and indigenous peo-
ples, who saw the project as a viable opportunity for implementing
sustainable development in the region. After over two years of
implementation, however, the indigenous peoples and the rubber
tappers had received virtually none of the promised benefits, and
these former supporters of the project became vocal critics.
At the center of PLANAFLORO's implementation problems is a
lack of political commitment in Brazil to make the changes neces-
sary to establish and then defend the economic and social zoning
plans. From the beginning, institutional reform was a major con-
dition of the loan agreement. The promised reforms involved
sweeping changes in policies, regulations, and investment pro-
grams, so as to provide positive incentives for sustainable develop-
ment. After the loan was signed, however, Brazil and the state of
Rondonia's commitment to these institutional reforms dissolved.
Loan proceeds for road construction and other agricultural sup-
port flowed, but virtually nothing was done to protect the indige-
nous lands or ecological reserves.
When confronted with questions about implementation, the
Bank typically identified external factors that made it powerless to
improve implementation of PLANAFLORO. Commonly cited
external factors included: (1) delays in the release of financial
resources, especially counterpart funding by State and Federal gov-
ernment agencies; (2) deficiencies in the institutional capacities of
executing agencies; and (3) political instability during election peri-
ods. Apparently, as in POLONOROESTE, the Bank had once
again "misread the human, institutional and physical realities of the
jungle and the frontier." The real problem is perhaps even more fun-
damental to Bank operations. The Bank's overriding culture is one
that rewards the approval of loans, regardless of project quality; this
approval culture is not well-suited to pressuring recalcitrant borrow-
ers, particularly those as important as Brazil, into making politically
unpopular decisions even if they are conditions in loan agreements.
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By the middle of 1994, the failed implementation of PLANAFLORO
was clear to most NGOs and independent observers. In June
1994, the Rondonia NGO Forum wrote a letter to the Bank Presi-
dent and Executive Directors asking that the Bank cease further
disbursement until the government complied with the loan agree-
ment and responded to issues raised by an independent evaluation
conducted as part of project monitoring. In response, the Bank
sent a mission to the region in August, after which two Aide Mem-
oires were signed: one between the NGOs and the Government of
Rondonia, and one between the Government of Rondonia, the
Federal Government and the World Bank. The Aide Memoires
included several steps that could improve the situation in Rondo-
nia. By June, however, the schedule of implementation had slipped
again; in the views of the claimants, the August mission had not
resulted in any substantive improvements.
III. THE PLANAFLORO CLAIM
The PLANAFLORO claim was filed in June 1995 by twenty-five
Brazilian organizations representing small farmers, rubber tappers,
indigenous communities, rural unions, and environmental and
human rights groups affected by the loan. The 80-page claim
emphasizes the Bank's failure to supervise implementation of the
loan, as well as violations of several Bank policies and directives.
The overall goal of the PLANAFLORO claim was to increase
accountability and improve implementation of the loan.
At the center of the claim was the allegation that the Bank had
failed to supervise adequate implementation of the loan. A num-
ber of specific, major deviations from the project design were iden-
tified. Examples include the following:
(1) Failure to adopt an agreement between the Government of
Rondonia and the National Institute for Colonization and Land
Reform ("INCRA"). INCRA is the federal land agency responsible
for promoting development and regularizing land title in the Ama-
zon. The agreement between INCRA and Rondonia, designed to
ensure that development policies would be consistent with the
PLANAFLORO project, was supposed to be a condition for loan
effectiveness. At the time the claim was filed, neither an adequate
agreement nor a workplan implementing the agreement had yet
been signed. This left INCRA free to promote development and
colonization of areas that were supposed to be protected under the
terms of the PLANAFLORO project.' 2
(2) Failure to establish, institutionalize and maintain conservation
units. The Project Agreement provided for the creation of several
specific extractive reserves and sustained yield forests. The Agree-
ment also contemplated that the state agencies would be restruc-
tured to manage these reserves effectively, and that a system of laws
and regulations elaborating standards consistent with the goals of
the reserves would be enacted. By the time the claim was filed, the
conservation units had not been created, nor had the government
of Rondonia taken any major steps toward legally defining "State
Extractive Forests" or "State Sustained Yield Forests", two cate-
gories of reserves promised in the project agreements. Other con-
servation units had not been demarcated correctly or were not
being maintained against the encroachment of settlers.1
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(3) Failure to eliminate perverse development incentives. According
to the project design, the Borrower was to eliminate economic and
fiscal incentives that encouraged inefficient resource allocation,
non-sustainable private investment and environmental degrada-
tion. Revised federal and state investment programs were supposed
to reflect land use capabilities and environmental considerations.
Although a small rural credit fund was created to promote the
goals of the agroecological zoning plans, this was dwarfed by other
credit programs and government-sponsored development projects
(including new road construction and hydroelectric development
aimed at facilitating new settlements). According to the claimants,
the government also never instituted the media campaign aimed at
explaining the new agroecological zoning plans. Such a campaign
was an important part of the project, because it would reduce pres-
sure on the region's resources by reducing the number of migrating
settlers.14
(4) Failure to implement an indigenous peoples plan or to ensure
protection ofindigenous reserves. According to the Bank's Operational
Directive 4.20, the Bank is obligated to conduct an indigenous
peoples plan through the informed participation of the indigenous
communities. The project documents also contemplated the
demarcation of at least five and as many as nineteen indigenous
area, improvements in health care, and other support. Allocations
for the indigenous subcomponent were insufficient to conduct
these activities, amounting to just under $4 million; by contrast,
the road and river transport component was almost $57 million.' 5
Although the Borrower government is directly responsible for all
of these deviations from the project's design, the claimants argued
that at some point the Bank, too, is responsible for ensuring its
funding is used for the purposes set forth in the original loan
agreements. Brazil's violations of the loan agreements were power-
ful evidence of the Bank's failure to take its oversight role seriously.
IV. THE INSPECTION PANEL PROCESS IN PLANAFLORO
As set forth in the Resolution creating the Inspection Panel and
the Panel's Operating Procedures, the Inspection Panel process
includes two major stages: a preliminary assessment stage, in
which a claim is reviewed to determine whether it is technically
eligible and otherwise merits a full inspection, and the inspection
stage in which the Panel conducts a full inspection and makes
findings. The preliminary stage includes four steps: (1) the request
is received and registered by the Panel if it is not frivolous or obvi-
ously lacking necessary information; (2) Management responds to
the claim within twenty-one days; (3) the Panel has twenty-one
days to review the claim, Management's response and any other
information; and (4) the Board decides to authorize a full inspec-
tion or to reject the claim. Once the board authorizes an inspec-
tion, the Panel is allowed to conduct a thorough inspection and
make findings about any violations of Bank policies.'
6
The following sections track the chronology of the PLANAFLORO
claim as it moved through the preliminary assessment stage. As
discussed below, the Inspection Panel process ultimately was cut
short by the Board. What should have been a preliminary inquiry
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into whether the claim was appropriate became a highly politicized
decision over the role of the Bank in monitoring and supervising
projects.
A. Registration of the Claim.
On June 19, 1995, the Panel registered the claim, or at least most
of it. In the notice of registration, the Panel specifically excluded
the allegations in the claim relating to procurement matters.
Based on Paragraph 14(b) of the Panel Resolution, the Panel ruled
that all procurement issues fell outside the Panel's mandate. Para-
graph 14(b) of the Resolution forbids:
Complaints against procurement decisions by Bank borrow-
ers from suppliers of goods and services financed or expected
to be financed by the Bank under a loan agreement, or from
losing tenderers for the supply of any such goods and ser-
vices, which will continue to be addressed by staff under
existing procedures. 1
The Board thus forbids procurement-related claims brought by
suppliers of goods and services or from losing tenderers, because
private sector companies that lose in the procurement process have
other options for relief available. The Board also feared that the
Panel would be flooded by claims if losing parties in the procure-
ment process could trigger a claim.
In the PLANAFLORO claim, however, the claimants were not
suppliers of goods and services nor losing tenderers. They were not
raising the procurement violations because they had a financial
stake in procuremen,t nor even complaining that the ultimate pro-
curement decisions were right or wrong. Rather, the claimants
argued that the Bank's failure to meet the timeline laid out in the
Operational Directive on procurement led directly to delays in
finalizing the agroecological zoning plans, which in turn allowed
the continued exploitation of areas that were supposed to be pro-
tected.' 8 In the claimants' view, the Bank's apparent efforts to pro-
tect the Government of Rondonia from embarrassment over unfair
procurement practices violated its own policies and led to delays
that threatened the entire project. These allegations raised serious
concerns about the Bank's commitment to project quality and to
meaningful oversight of project implementation in the face of
client-state pressures. A full inspection presumably could have
helped to curb such activities in the future.
B. Management's Initial Response.
Bank Management's response generally confirmed that the proj-
ect's implementation had been unacceptable, stating that it
"share[d] the frustration with the Project's slow progress." 19
Nonetheless, the Management's response opposed the claim on a
wide range of technical and legal issues. Three of the Bank's argu-
ments were specific to how the PLANAFLORO claim was drafted,
including that: (1) some parts of the claim failed to identify spe-
cific policies or procedures that were violated; (2) some of the alle-
gations were not linked to any specific harm; and (3) some of the
identified policies were not in force at the time.
These three relatively technical arguments never played a signifi-
cant role in the further processing of the claim, primarily because
any reasoned reading of the claim showed allegations of a serious
pattern of neglect by the Bank in meeting its oversight and man-
agement obligations and that this in turn allowed continued
destruction of the region's natural resources. The PLANAFLORO
claimants included representatives of indigenous peoples and rub-
bertappers whose livelihoods depend on the conservation of nat-
ural resources in the area affected by the PLANAFLORO project.
Although these arguments were never accepted by the Panel, the
Bank's opposition to the PLANAFLORO claim on such technical
grounds reflected Management's overly legalistic and antagonistic
approach to claims. Rather than cooperating to support the Panel
in identifying and solving problems raised by affected parties,
Bank Management's advocacy-oriented approach could raise sub-
stantial barriers for claimants without achieving any substantive
purpose. Demanding more specificity than was already included in
the 80-page PLANAFLORO claim, for example, would unneces-
sarily discourage future claimants and narrow the Panel's authority.
Three other arguments by Bank Management raised broader issues
of eligibility with potentially major implications for the future of
the Panel process.
(1) MaterialAdverse Harm. Management argued that the entire
PLANAFLORO claim should be dismissed because there was no
material adverse harm to the claimants. According to Manage-
ment's Response, "the Project does not finance or promote any of
the adverse impacts alleged in the Request. In fact, the Project
aims at the improvement of the very situations raised in the
Request." 20 Bank Management argued that material and adverse
harm should be measured against what the situation was before
the Bank got involved in this specific project. Management's stan-
dard would have excluded all projects where Panel oversight could
improve projects and left within the Panel purview only those pro-
jects that affirmatively cause damage. The alternative standard,
implicitly adopted by the Panel in recommending a full inspec-
tion, measured the claimants current situation against what the
project was supposed to accomplish if the Bank followed its poli-
cies and procedures.
(2) The Standard of Conduct. The second major issue raised by
Management's response was what standard should be applied by
the Panel in overseeing Management's activities. Management
argued for a standard based on "negligence or a lack of concern, at
least with respect to its discretionary duties. More specifically,
Management argued that its decision not to threaten to suspend
payments under the loan or to take other steps available to it
under the Bank's Operational Directives should not normally be
reviewed by the Panel, except where Management was clearly neg-
ligent. Management's position suggested that the standard of con-
duct might be higher than simply whether, in the Panel's opinion,
Management followed its own rules or not. Adding a "negligence"
factor would add an element of subjectivity to what should other-
wise be an objective inquiry into whether Management had fol-
lowed certain policies or procedures. The more objective standard
would comport better with the Panel's fact-finding function.
(3) The Panel's Role in Ongoing Projects and the Bank/Borrower
Relationship. The third major issue was how much oversight the
Panel should have over the Borrower's actions. This proved to be a
central concern of Brazil and the Board of Executive Directors.
Unlike claims raised before implementation begins (such as the
Arun claim), the PLANAFLORO claim raised issues about Brazil's
policies and activities with regard to the development of the Ama-
zon region. Although the claim was focused on the Bank's failure
to supervise, the evidence of this failure was a long litany of alleged
violations of the loan agreement by Brazil. Allowing an interna-
tional institution, such as the Inspection Panel, to investigate the
land-use and development policies of a country raised serious
questions of national sovereignty, particularly to the developing
country representatives on the Board. Some even suggested that
the Panel resembled a "World Court" in which the parties never
consented to jurisdiction.
C. The First Board Review of the Panel Recommendation.
After reviewing Bank Management's response and visiting the pro-
ject area, the Panel recommended that the Bank's Executive Direc-
tors authorize a full inspection. The Panel's recommendation
acknowledged:
Management [made a great] effort in providing extensive
information and [executed] a fair and realistic assessment of
most of the project's difficulties and delays. Nevertheless, the
Panel has concluded that such information is not adequate
to obviate the need for an investigation. Even though Man-
agement has addressed the complaints, the Panel is not con-
vinced that there has been full compliance with the relevant
policies and procedures. It is also not convinced, in the
instances where Management admits failures, that proposed
remedial measures will be adequate for compliance with the
relevant policies and procedures.2 1
The Panel's recommendation was very brief and did not provide
many details, primarily because the Panel did not want to be
accused of having pre-judged the validity of the claim. Indeed,
some Executive Directors had reportedly criticized the Panel for
providing too much information in their preliminary assessment
of the Arun claim.
The Board considered the Panel's recommendation on Septem-
ber 12, 1995. The Board was faced with the difficult choice of
embarrassing Brazil, a major client/borrower, or rejecting a strong
claim, thus crippling the Panel. The broadly divided Board could
not reach consensus on whether to authorize a full inspection, and
so it sought a politically acceptable compromise. The Board ulti-
mately postponed any real action, deciding that "before a decision
could be made ... on the Panel's recommendation to investigate
the complaints, the Panel should conduct an additional review to
further substantiate the materiality of the damages and to establish
whether such damages were caused by a deviation from Bank
policies and procedures." 22 The Executive Directors decision
required the Panel to gather more information regarding the
alleged damages and to demonstrate a causal link between this
damage and a violation of Bank policies and procedures. In the
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meantime, Management was expected to continue its supervisory
efforts and to develop a plan for improving implementation.
D. The Panel's Additional Review and Management's
Action Plan.
In light of the Board's request for more information, the Panel
conducted an "Additional Review" of the allegations in the
PLANAFLORO claim to identify material damage caused by vio-
lations of the Bank policies and procedures. The Panel's account
demonstrated serious damage from illegal logging, illegal settle-
ments sometimes supported by INCRA, invasions of protected
areas, and burning of the forests. For example, the Panel estimated
that PLANAFLORO's failure to reduce deforestation resulted in
$32 million in lost commercial value of forests annually. The Panel
estimated that just the Uru-eu-wau-wau Reserve lost approxi-
mately $2 million worth of commercial timber during the period
of PLANAFLORO implementation. The Additional Review also
"further substantiated" thePanel's view that violations of Bank
policies and procedures had contributed to continued damage to
the claimants. Their findings are worth reviewing:
Critical delays occurred for three years between approval of
the Loan and filing of the Request because:
The Bank did not supervise PLANAFLORO effectively and
failed to enforce implementation of key actions that were to
be the basis of successful execution of the Project.
Supervision of implementation has been weak due to the
lack of a permanent presence of Bank Staff in the project
area and a rather complacent reaction to repeated defaults
on covenants under the Loan.
Shortcomings in supervision are evidenced by the fact that
long delayed actions have suddenly become possible since
the Request was filed.
Delays in the project have contributed to a breakdown of
trust between NGOs and the Bank, making the direct
involvement of civil society in any reorientation of the Proj-
ect important. Some of the remedial measures proposed in
the Report regarding NGO participation may, however,
result in future alienation of intended Project beneficiaries.
Postponement of a timely reorientation of the Project has
substantially delayed achievement of many of
PLANAFLORO's objectives and caused continuing damage
to the interests of intended beneficiaries.
Now the situation for many intended beneficiaries is by and
large worse than two years ago. 23
On December 20, Bank staff submitted to the Executive Directors
a Status Report and Action Plan setting forth its plan for improv-
ing implementation. According to the Status Report: "[t]he Proj-
ect's major achievement has been to help the State place about 60%
of its total area off-limits to development, preventing the imple-
mentation of roads, settlements, and other public investments in
areas which are either unsuitable for agriculture or ecologically
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fragile. However, the im lementation of PLANAFLORO has been
slower than expected." 2 Management's Status Report is detailed
and admits that Brazil's institutional and policy framework
impedes full implementation of the Project. Based on the belief
that the action plan was sufficient to meet the demands of the
claim, Bank Management again asked the Board to vote against
the full Panel inspection.
In a January 18, 1996 letter to World Bank President James
Wolfensohn, the Rondonia NGO Forum complained that the
Bank never provided the Action Plan for review nor was it respon-
sive to the specific allegations raised in the claim. The Forum
renewed their request for an inspection on behalf of the claimants,
stating that: "[a] formal investigation by the Inspection Panel is
essential to correct the mistakes in the execution of the
PLANAFLORO, and to contribute to a learning process within
the World Bank and the Brazilian government on the practical
implementation of a new generation of sustainable development
"25
projects.
E. The Board's Second Decision.
Despite the Panel's documentation of damage in the PLANAFLORO
project region and the Panel's view that this damage was at least
exacerbated by violations of the Bank's policies and procedures, on
January 25, 1996 the Bank's Executive Directors denied the Panel
authority to investigate the claim. To gain consensus, however, the
Board explicitly agreed to review the project in six to nine months,
and agreed that it would invite the Panel to participate in that
review. In the meantime, the Board supported Management's Action
Plan as being sufficient to cure the implementation problems.
Like its first decision, the Board's denial must be viewed as a
political compromise having little to do with the merits of the
PLANAFLORO claim. The developing country Executive Direc-
tors, as well as a few donor country Executive Directors (most
notably representing the United Kingdom and France), opposed
any continued involvement by the Panel. On the other hand, the
remaining donor countries and the Bank President apparently sup-
ported some continued involvement of the Panel. Viewed in this
light, the decision is diplomatically astute. Bank Management is
given another opportunity to improve its oversight; Brazil's embar-
rassment is minimized; and the Bank can take credit for support-
ing further review of PLANAFLORO. In fact, the Bank press
release was entitled "World Bank Calls for Further Review of
PLANAFLORO Project in Brazil."2 6 NGOs and the press, by
contrast, primarily saw the decision as a rejection of the Panel
process and an effort by the Bank to circumvent accountability for
the specific allegations raised by the claimants. 27
V. CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
The Executive Directors decision to reject a full inspection, but to
"invite the Panel to participate" in a subsequent review of
PLANAFLORO's inspection raises many questions about the
future of the PLANAFLORO project and the Panel process.
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The PLAIAFLORO Project. The Rondonia NGO Forum expressed
its disappointment that a formal investigation was not approved
and that the inspection panel process was apparently so politicized.
On the other hand, the Forum recognized that the claim and the
Board decision opened new possibilities for improving implemen-
tation of the project, as long as several conditions were met. For
example, the claimants asked to be allowed to negotiate with the
Bank over the specific components of the action plan, in order to
ensure that their original concerns are addressed. The claimants
also sought assurances that the Panel would be given complete
freedom and adequate resources to conduct their review of the
project in six or nine months.
The Forum's position is consistent with the tenuous, but real,
advances made in implementation of PLANAFLORO since the
claim was filed in June, 1995. Even according to the claimants, Bank
supervision of the project noticeably improved.28 In addition, the
long-awaited agreement between INCRA (the Federal land-use
agency) and the government of Rondonia was signed just a few
weeks after the claim was filed. According to the Management Status
Report, the implementing workplan was also signed in August. More
telling, perhaps, is that three extractive reserves, totalling over
330,000 hectares of land, were created by decrees in July and
August.29 At least two of these reserves were specifically named in
the loan agreements, but there was no progress in creating them in
the two years of implementation prior to the claim being filed. More
generally, many of the allegations originally made by the claimants
have been confirmed either by the Management's Status Report or
the Panel's Additional Review. This does not begin to ensure that real
change will occur, but it does validate those individuals and organi-
zations that took the courageous and difficult step to file the claim.
The Panel experience was not all positive for the claimants, how-
ever. Filing the claim was expensive, requiring significant financial
and human resources. Even more importantly, the PLANAFLORO
process took on a life of its own, separate from the demands of the
claimants. Unlike a judicial proceeding, the claimants did not nec-
essarily retain control over their claim. These claimants specifically
did not ask for the loan to be suspended, but rather wanted
inspection and greater supervision to improve implementation.
Once the claim was filed, decisions as to whether to suspend a
loan or to recommend suspension could have been taken unilater-
ally by Bank Management or the Panel, respectively. Moreover,
current reliance on the action plan in Management's Status
Report brings no guarantees that the primary concerns raised in
the claim will be adopted. Furthermore, there are no clear proce-
dures for how the Panel will be involved in the future "review" of
PLANAFLORO, and there is little guarantee of even minimal
public oversight or transparency in the process.
The Future ofthe Panel. In addressing PLANAFLORO and other
claims with objectivity and professionalism, the Panel has gained
the respect and trust of the NGO community. The Panel is seen as
an important opportunity for improving the Bank's performance
and accountability. It is also viewed as an important model for
similar mechanisms at the regional development banks (both the
Asian Development Bank and the InterAmerican Development
Bank have adopted similar mechanisms).
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Nonetheless, the Executive Director's rejection of the claim under-
mines the public's confidence in the Panel process. Despite invit-
ing the Panel to review the project at a later date, PLANAFLORO
marked the first time that the Board rejected an inspection recom-
mended by the Panel. Discussions among the Executive Directors
surrounding the claim revealed how deeply divided the Board is
over the Panel. Most telling was the Directors' initial refusal to
approve the investigation of the claim, primarily because of fears of
embarrassing major clients like Brazil, even when they are violat-
ing their loan agreement. Decisions like this, coupled with the
antagonistic approach taken to the Panel by some members of the
Bank's senior management, could reflect a serious threat to the
future of the Panel.
Indeed, during the Executive Directors' first discussion of the
PLANAFLORO claim, the Board authorized an early review of
the overall experience with the Panel. That process began this Feb-
ruary when the Board referred the review of the Panel to the Com-
mittee on Development Effectiveness (CODE). CODE is
expected to review the Panel's record with an eye toward facilitat-
ing a full Board review in August or September. Given the inabil-
ity of the Board to reach consensus on a full inspection of the
PLANAFLORO claim, many observers are concerned that the
Board will weaken the Panel's mandate.
Ironically, the Board's review of the Panel could coincide with the
further review of the PLANAFLORO claim, as both are expected
in or around September. This suggests that the interests of the
PLANAFLORO claimants may once again be subjugated to a
broader political debate over the future of the Panel.
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